This article critically assesses the legal issues surrounding the contemporary act of adolescent sexting via the philosophical methodology of ontology. Through this methodology the article aims to highlight the significance of the mobile phone, and the social objects which it produces in the world, pertaining to the act of sexting. Highlighting this device's abilities, uses, and presentday ubiquity offers an alternate insight to both the current legislative parameters and legal commentary on sexting. This is because neither the law governing sexting, nor the majority of the legal commentary on this act, has engaged with the presence of the mobile phone in our contemporary world and the way it has revolutionised our lives. In order to offer an alternative lens through which to view this act, the article draws on the deconstructive work of Jacques Derrida and the new realist ontology of Maurizio Ferraris, to offer comment on how and why digital writing must be reckoned with in the twenty-first century. Using these theorists, and others, the article illustrates the importance of the mobile phone and how its role as the quintessential writing machine of the third millennium must be recognised in order to correctly legislate the act of adolescent sexting.
Introduction
'Sexting', understood as the consensual distribution of self-generated sexually explicit imagery through internet-connected mobile devices, 1 has come under severe scrutiny in the UK. This is because of the prevalence of sexting, its impact on the sexual lives of adolescents, and the illegality of the act when committed by them. However, the current legal analysis of sexting has thus far focused on the application of relevant law and the potential sanctions following a successful prosecution. However, there are important aspects of sexting which exist beyond the legality of the act which need to be considered. By shedding light on this other dimension, it may be possible to avoid future legislation falling into the same trap as the ill-fated and paradoxical legislative amendments responsible for the debacle surrounding adolescent sexting. To this end, this article offers an original philosophical investigation into sexting, its legal significance, and surrounding circumstances. This piece will be adopting a philosophical study of ontology to examine sexting and to offer insights into the significance of the social objects, created by mobile phones, which constitute this contemporary act.
On 1 May 2004, the majority of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (SOA 2003) came into force. The Act contained an amendment which made it illegal to make, possess, or share indecent images of those under 18 years of age, whereas the law had previously only applied to images of those under 16 years of age. 2 The amendment also removed an exception which had been tabled by the Lords 3 whereby there would be no crime to answer for if a person of 16 or 17 years of age had consented to the taking of a such an image. But with the removal of the exception, s.45 of the SOA 2003 effectively raised the age of a 'child' from 16 to 18 years old.
Yet, during the final Commons Standing Committee drafting discussion which removed the exception and finalised the amendment, there was no mention of a digital technology which at the time was revolutionising the creation, storing, and sharing of images. 4 The technology noticeably absent from any discussion was the camera-equipped mobile phonethe first generation 'smartphone'which at the time was undergoing an exponential growth in the UK to the number of tens of millions. 5 The uptake of this technology was so rapid that even before the amended law was in force, Kodak had already stopped selling 35 mm cameras in the US and Western Europe, due to the pervasiveness of the camera-phone. 6 As a consequence of the legislature's lack of consideration of this new technology, when the SOA 2003 came into force in 2004, it was already drastically disparate from twenty-first-century society. It failed catastrophically to coalesce with a society where smartphones were ubiquitous because neither the prevalence nor significance of this technology had been discussed. And in a society where ownership of this technology is pervasive, where this device is 'in our hand, at a hand's reach … the absolute tool, the machine to end all the others because it sums them all up', 7 it is the smartphone which creates, stores, and shares most of our images. Bernard Harcourt has argued that this technological revolution has led to 'a new political and social condition that is radically transforming our relations to each other, our political communities, and ourselves'. 8 He argues that through devices such as the smartphone:
we are not so much being coerced, surveilled, or secured today as we are exposing or exhibiting ourselves knowingly, many of us willingly, with all our love, lust, passion, and politics, others anxiously, ambivalently, even perhaps despite ourselvesbut still, knowingly exposing ourselves. 9 But given that the technology enabling this expository era was not given the requisite forethought during legislative drafting, the law relevant to sexting was predestined to be anachronous to life in the twenty-first century. In response to previous positivist legal engagements, 10 this article seeks to broaden our understanding of sexting by shedding light on the crucial, and yet neglected, object of the mobile phone. Through this analysis, the article aims to provide a more nuanced inquiry into sexting which pays heed to the social, technological, and philosophical significance of this millennial tabula.
Drawing on the deconstructive thought of Jacques Derrida and the related work of Maurizio Ferraris, this article deploys philosophy as its methodology because it allows for an insightful comment on what it means to use mobile digital technologies to 'write' ourselves into the digital world. Harcourt explains this world as follows: '[o]ver the past ten to fifteen years, our digital selfthe subject's second bodyhas taken on a life of its own and become more tangible than our analog self'. 11 Ferraris' work is particularly apt in illuminating this digital world because in 2005, only a year after the SOA was in force, he published a book which Umberto Eco described as an '"anthropology" of the mobile phone' 12 and which allowed us to better understand this revolutionary device. 13 Such an understanding came via Ferraris' 'Derridean' 14 ontological questioning of the mobile phone, meaning an interrogation into the 'being' or the 'reality' of the mobile phone. This inquiry led him to argue that 'the mobile phone is a writing machine', 15 and consequently a 'formidable tool for constructing social reality'. 16 They achieve this by 'writing' a plethora of 'social objects' such as emails, SMS and MMS messages, social media posts, and other user-generated content, all of which are now utilised as the basis for sexting. Ferraris explained the philosophy behind these social objects by showing that 'at the source of the construction of social objects there are social acts fixed by memory', 17 as are found in the circuit boards of internet-connected mobile phones. 18 However, given that Ferraris' book was only translated into English in 2014, this is the first Englishlanguage publication to apply this seminal work to legal issues arising from the use of mobile phones, in this instance sexting. As Ferraris prophetically wrote over 10 years ago: 'It's simple; every technical inventionfrom the club to the lever to the wheel, from the sail to gunpowder to sticky noteschanges people's lives. But life remains 9 Ibid 18. 10 For example, see Nigel Stone, 'The "Sexting" Quagmire: Criminal Justice Responses to Adolescent's Electronic Transmission of Indecent Images in the UK and the USA' (2011) 11 Youth Justice 266. 11 Harcourt (n 8) 253. 12 Ferraris (n 7) vii. The book in question was Maurizio Ferraris, Dove sei? Ontologia del telefonino (Bompiani, 2005) . 13 Ferraris (n 7) ix. 14 Ibid vii: ' … we shall see to what extent words like writing, recording and "inscription" prick up a Derridean's ears'. 15 Ibid 1 16 Ibid 6. 17 Maurizio Ferraris, Documentality: Why It Is Necessary to Leave Traces (Richard Davies tr, Fordham University Press, 2013) 165. 18 Ferraris (n 7) 7:
[S]ocial ontology lies on a writing system, which can very well do without mobile phones (it already existed in the age of Sumerians and Pharaohs), but which mobile phones perfectly embody, allowing or promising the connection to all systems for oral or written communication; the access to all record circuits (writing, images, music); the possibility to check one's bank account, to pay for bus or opera tickets and, if one wishes to, to download this book so as to read it on the train. situated in a world that has its laws and enforces them.' 19 And yet, despite mobile phones being the dominant causal technology behind sexting, they have not received the requisite attention to do justice to this issue. Until such a rigorous philosophical examination has taken place and the law is altered to adequately accommodate this technological epoch, the current law governing the sexual lives of adolescents will remain a relic in the twentyfirst century.
Beyond this introduction, the article develops over five sections. The first explores the social setting of sexting, its legal position, and how authorities have responded to its everyday occurrence. The second section then provides an account of Derrida's philosophy and his work on digital technology in the late twentieth century. This then leads into the third section which engages with the Ferrari's work as a continuation, and specialisation, of Derrida's thinking, as applied to mobile phones in the twenty-first century, explaining how they 'write' our world. The penultimate section then re-examines sexting via the lens of the 'writing' emanating from the ever-connected, 'wired, plugged in, online', mobile phone, 20 which has outpaced society's contemporary laws. The fifth and concluding section then looks to legislative developments in Australia which could point the way forward in terms of addressing the ill-fated law surrounding sexting.
Sexting: statistics, law, and commentary

An introduction to sexting
From the available quantitative and qualitative data on sextingthe consensual sharing of self-generated sexual imagery via internet-connected mobile technologythe prevalence of the act is significant. 21 Although quantitative studies are limited in accuracy, it is estimated that 'about a third of teenagers' in the United States are involved in the act. 22 In Britain, according to a 2016 investigation by The Times which dated back to 2012 and which covered 50 of the country's biggest secondary schools, it was found 'that 44,112 secondary school pupils have been caught sexting in the past three years'. 23 The report notes this is only a conservative estimate given that schools will not be aware of many cases. Another recent report notes that children as young as seven have been investigated 19 Ibid 36. by police with regards to sexting. 24 Finally, the ground-breaking 2012 study conducted by the Institute of Education, University of London, Kings College London, and the London School of Economics and Political Science for the National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children (NSPCC), reported that '12% of 11-16 year olds in the UK have seen or received sexual message online'. 25 From these accounts, which merely scratch the surface of this complex issue, it appears that J.G. Ballard's premonition regarding sexual activity was correct:
Sexual intercourse can no longer be regarded as a personal and isolated activity, but is seen to be a vector in a public complex involving automobile styling, politics and mass communications. 26 Emerging from these reports, and the Ballardian frontier of networked sexual intercourse, is a fear of an inextricable social 'timebomb' tied to sexting. 27 In September 2016, in response to this 'timebomb', the UK Council for Child Internet Safety (UKCCIS), The Department for Education, and the NSPCC, issued updated joint-guidance for schools and educational establishments on how to deal with adolescent sexting. Of key concern was the clear message that '[m]aking, possessing and distributing any imagery of someone under 18 which is "indecent" is illegal. This includes imagery of yourself if you are under 18'. 28
Sexting and the law
The law surrounding sexting has been commented upon widely: the illegality of the act has received attention from the mainstream press, 29 children's charities, 30 and legal scholarship. 31 Much of the complexity in responding to youth produced sexual imagery is due to its legal status. Making, possessing and distributing any imagery of someone under 18 which is 'indecent' is illegal. This includes imagery of yourself if you are under 18. The relevant legislation is contained in the Protection of Children Act 1978 (England and Wales) as amended in the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (England and Wales).
Specifically:
. It is an offence to possess, distribute, show and make indecent images of children. The situation arising from this amendment has drawn commentary for several reasons. 35 One reason is the somewhat paradoxical role that the age of majority now plays within the law. As Gillespie notes '[i]n England and Wales the age of consent for sexual acts is 16 but this amendment ensures that whilst a 16-year-old can choose to undertake a sexual act, they cannot choose to be the subject of a pornographic photograph'; 'If, as noted above, a child can legally partake in sexual activities, how can photographs of them be considered indecent?' 36 Another reason for comment is the severity of the sanction which relates to this criminal act, whereby those who commit it 'are liable for a sentence of up to 10 years' imprisonment and [would] become a registered sex offender with all the repercussions that this brings'. 37 A further reason for comment is the stance taken by authorities seeking to avoid prosecuting adolescents who fall foul of 32 UKCCIS (n 28) 7. 33 As per the Government's 'Explanatory Notes' for this piece of legislation,
[t]his clause redefines a 'child' for the purposes of the Protection of Children Act 1978 ('the 1978 Act') as a person under 18 years, rather than under 16 years, of age. This change means the offences under that Act of taking, making, permitting to take, distributing, showing, possessing with intent to distribute, and advertising indecent photographs or pseudo-photographs of children will now also be applicable where the photographs concerned are of children of 16 or 17 years of age. thiswhat could be argued to be illogical 38law. The illogicality of the law stems from its drafting without any consideration for the 'mass adoption of the internet, mobiles and digital photography' 39 and anachronistic enforcement in an age when these technologies were commonplace. Two legal sources have commented on the law's illogicality, the first being the Chairman of the Criminal Bar Association, Mark Fenhalls QC:
Politicians must ensure that laws are logical and consistent. If they do not, the law will be considered an ass and public confidence in the rule of law will be damaged. It is legal for 16-yearolds to have sex with each other and yet illegal for 17-year-olds to take and keep naked pictures of each other. This makes no sense. This area of criminal law requires urgent review and reform. 40 Fenhalls comments that if the law permits 16-year-olds to engage in sexual intercourse with each other, then 'it makes no sense' that the law would simultaneously prohibit 17year-olds, or indeed 16-year-olds, from taking and keeping naked images of each other. Similarly, the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) is also clearly aware of the law's illogicality. In October 2016, the CPS released new guidance for the prosecution of offences, such as sexting, which have been committed 'by the sending of a communication via social media'. 41 With respect to sexting, the CPS has noted that 'care should be taken when considering any cases of "sexting" that involve images taken of persons under 18', explaining that 'it would not usually be in the public interest to prosecute the consensual sharing of an image between two children of a similar age in a relationship'. 42 Consequently, despite it being an illegal act when images of those below 18 years of age are created, stored, and distributed consensually by adolescents, the CPS has publicly stated that there is no public interest in prosecution.
'Revenge pornography'
However, the matter is entirely different if the image is shared without the consent of the subject involved. The Crown Prosecution Service: 'Guidelines on Prosecuting Cases Involving Communications Sent via Social Media': <http://www.cps.gov.uk/legal/a_to_c/communications_sent_via_social_media/> accessed 30 August 2017. Note that 'social media' refers to 'the use of electronic devices to create, share or exchange information, ideas, pictures and videos with others via virtual communities and networks. For the purposes of these guidelines, this includes emails and texts and other forms of electronic communications'. 42 Ibid. 43 See Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015 s 33, which came into force 13 April 2015:
pornography involves distribution which is executed neither by the subject of the image nor with their consent: as per s.33 CJCA 2015, revenge pornography occurs 'without the consent of an individual who appears in the photograph' 44 and 'with the intention of causing that individual distress'. 45 As noted in the government's commentary, outlawing revenge pornography aimed to protect individuals from actions done to them without their consent: 'This amendment, although it applies both online and offline, reflects the government's ongoing commitment to protecting people from bullying, exploitation and harassment on the internet.' 46 Here, the law's approach to the distribution of sexually explicit material is antithetical to the approach involving sexting because the law relating to revenge pornography was implemented with due attention paid to the cultural and technological context of the day. The legislation specifically aimed to 'target the growing issues caused by the technological advances' which could lead to 'the sending of sexually explicit content, primarily via mobile technology'. 47 From the origins of this lawas an amendment to the CJCA 2015 from the Lordsit is evident that its implementation followed a conscious account of the technology enabling revenge pornography: mobile, camera-wielding, internet-connected, smartphones:
My Lords, the term 'revenge pornography' refers to the publication, usually but not always, on the internet, of intimate images of former lovers without their consent. … Obtaining such images has become more common and much easier with the prevalence, popularity and sophistication of smartphones, with their ability to take or record high quality images, still and video, instantly and simply, with accompanying sound in the case of video. It is set to become even easier to take such images with the advent of cameras installed in glasses and yet further improvement in high definition video cameras in phones. 48 This twenty-first-century law on sexual relations is a 'well thought out, effectively debated statute', 49 which addresses a pressing issue of the day. 50 However, the current prohibition of consensual adolescent sexting cannot be described in the same way because this anachronous law was not implemented with the requisite attention paid to the technological context of the day. 51
Disclosing private sexual photographs and films with intent to cause distress.
(1) It is an offence for a person to disclose a private sexual photograph or film if the disclosure is made-(a) without the consent of an individual who appears in the photograph or film, and (b) with the intention of causing that individual distress. Consequently, on this point, this author does not agree with the following comment from Phippen and Agate (n 47) 84: 'With the older laws [referring to the SOA 2003], further complexity resides in the fact that the laws were put into place in a time before the phenomenon of self generation was technologically possible.'
In order to engage with this illogical law the legal analysis offered in this article concentrates on the sole causal reason behind the spike in the occurrence of sexting: the incredible proliferation of internet-connected mobile smartphones equipped with powerful digital cameras. This approach aims to avoid repeating the mistake made during the legislative process, where not enough requisite forethought was given to this technological development which was unfurling simultaneously to the legal drafting. 52 In early 2003, months prior to the legislation's finalisation, mainstream news was reporting that the exponential growth of camera-equipped smartphones was already changing society's understanding of digital images: 'All camera phones allow images to be instantly sent to other phones, copied to a website or e-mailed to others.' 53 Thus, it was already becoming apparent that 'camera phone owners are showing off indiscreet pictures taken without the subject's knowledge'. 54 Yet, when drafting the SOA 2003 to govern sexual relations in the twenty-first century, the legislature failed to make it representative of its time and place. The requirement for the law to be adaptive to societal change is absolutely crucial for its adequate existence in the world. As Peter Fitzpatrick has argued: 'Law cannot be purely fixed and pre-existent if it is to change and adapt to society, as it is so often said that it must.' 55 And he notes further, if law does not do 'everything', if law is not 'ever responsive to change', then 'law will eventually cease to rule the situation which has changed around it'. 56 It seems that it may now be the case that because it did not adapt in a responsive manner to the technological changes occurring around it, the law governing sexting has now ceased to adequately rule the twenty-first-century world it finds itself in.
To avoid repeating the mistake of the legislature, this piece aims to contribute to our understanding of sexting by locating it within its unique social context. For today, nearly a decade and a half after the coming into force of the law, Ofcom's 2016 'Communications Market Report' states that 90% of UK 16-24-year-olds and 91% of UK 25-34-yearolds own a smartphone: 57 the smartphone is truly ubiquitous. The explosion in this technology has now ensured that the mobile, near-instantaneous, creation and dissemination Adults under 55 were more likely to own a smartphone in 2016, compared to the UK overall. The difference in the ownership of smartphones between younger and older age groups is stark: twice as many 16-24s and 25-34s owned a smartphone (90% and 91% respectively) than over-55s (42%). Over-55s were less likely than adults in the UK overall to own a smartphone (42% vs. 71%). In a mere nine years the smartphone has had a massive impact on UK society. Collectively, UK citizens look at their smartphones over a billion times a day. Four out of five adults now have one. Among 18-44 year olds, adoption is higher still at 91 per centequivalent to 21 million people.
This data collection was 'based on a nationally representative sample of 4000 UK consumers aged 18-75. The sample follows a country specific quota on age, gender, region, working and socio-economic status'. <http://www.deloitte.co. uk/mobileuk/assets/pdf/Deloitte-Mobile-Consumer-2016-There-is-no-place-like-phone.pdf> accessed 30 August 2017. of digital content across borders and oceans via the internet is a completely banal act of the third millennium. 58 Yet, due to the law's inability to comprehend this era, sexting remains incompetently accounted for. With this problematic made clear, the next section of this article moves to conduct an investigation into the significance and philosophical resonance of the mobile phone, the 'formidable tool for constructing social reality'. 59
Deconstruction and digital technology
In order to examine the mobile phone's philosophical significance, it is first necessary to explain this article's methodology. Accordingly, the next two sections of this article are related explanatory sections. The first part explains the work of Jacques Derrida, firstly in general and then with regard to digital technology. The second part then moves to explain Ferraris' Derridean philosophy and its application to the mobile phone via his seminal book Where Are You? An Ontology of the Cell Phone.
Jacques Derrida: an introduction
Jacques Derrida (1930 Derrida ( -2004 ) is most well known for his philosophical theory of 'deconstruction' and its ground-breaking effect on the humanities. 60 His work involved a radical rethinking of writing, in which he argued that Western philosophy had incorrectly viewed writing as 'a secondary and instrumental function', or a 'translator' of 'speech that was fully present'. 61 In retort, Derrida posited an 'enlarged and radicalized' 62 account which more accurately represented the technology, or techné, 63 of writing in the late twentieth century: this was the argument in his 1967 book De la Grammatologie, 64 published in English as Of Grammatology in 1976. Therein Derrida argued that our modern 'enlarged' understanding of writing refers to 'all that gives rise to an inscription in general'. 65 This meant that writing encompasses 'not only the physical gestures of literal pictographic 58 This essentially completes the vision of Web 2.0, first conceived in 1999. This will be referred to below. For the origin of this concept, see Darcy DiNucci, 'Fragmented Future' (1999) Print Magazine. 59 Ferraris (n 7) 6. Thus what is decisive in techné does not at all lie in making and manipulating, nor in the using of means, but rather in the revealing mentioned before. It is as revealing, and not as manufacturing, that techné is a bringing-forth. 64 Jacques Derrida, De la Grammatologie (Les Editions de Minuit, 1967). 65 Derrida (n 61) 9. or ideographic inscription, but also the totality of what makes it possible'. 66 In short, the technology of writing is, and encompasses, any process which produces inscriptions; inscriptions are marks 'on a physical substrate whatsoever, from marble to neurons, passing through paper and computers', 67 which allow for entities to survive the passing of time. '[C]inematography', 'choreography', and 'pictorial, musical, [and] sculptural "writing"' are all examples of writing because they produce inscriptions which survive the passing of time. 68 Further examples include inscriptions 'found on a piece of paper or in a computer file' 69 or what a biologist may refer to as the 'writing and pro-gram' found in 'the most elementary processes of information within the living cell'. 70 Derrida argued that this understanding of writing accounted for the existence of all entities from the '"non-living" up to "consciousness", passing through all levels of animal organization'. 71 Finally, he used the term 'texts' to refer to all the grounds and planes of existence which contain written inscriptions: a text is a 'fabric of signs'. 72 This led to, perhaps, Derrida's most famous philosophical maxim: 'There is nothing outside of the text [there is no outside-text; il n'y a pas de hors-texte].' 73 This maxim asserts that because a 'transcendental signifier' 74 does not exist, that is a phenomenon existing without reference to another signifier, the consequence is that inscriptions only ever refer to other inscriptions, within 'texts', in an infinite cycle of reference. This is Derrida's critique of metaphysics: 'the process of signification which orders the displacement and substitutions for this law of central presence'. 75 In summary, Derrida argued that the technology of writing is unsurpassed because it produces the inscriptions which allow entities to survive the passing of time, whilst housed within unlimited fields of referentiality.
The later years of Derrida's work saw him explicitly address the developing digital technologies of the late twentieth century, including multimedia consumer electronics, email, and the internet. But given his death in 2004, he did not experience the ubiquity of highend laptops, smartphones, and high-speed mobile internet connections. Consequently, his work on this dawning era of this technology consisted of proto-philosophical musings regarding how 'writing' would be taken up in the digital era: 76 'we still need inscriptions, 66 Ibid. 67 Maurizio Ferraris, 'Social Ontology and Documentality' in Giovanni Sartor, Pompeu Casanovas, Maria Angela Biasiotti, and Meritxell Fernández-Barrera (eds) Approaches to Legal Ontologies: Theories, Domains, Methodologies (Springer Dordrecht, 2011) 91. 68 Derrida (n 61) 47. See also Ferraris (n 17) 176: 'The cinema, which is strangely opposed to the book, is a registered and repeatable object, essentially like writing, and these days is often recorded on the same media used for writing.' I do not consider obnoxious the idea that also brain processes are to be described in terms of a sort of writing, since they manifest to us exactly in those terms, as it is revealed also by the fact that the mind has always been described as a tabula rasa, i.e. a writing table. 71 Derrida (n 61) 47. 72 Ibid 14. See also 65. 73 Ibid 158. and no one, apart from Derrida, realised this'. 77 Yet, little could Derrida have known that the mobile phone would soon house all the technological advances he witnessed and much more. And during this period, in an almost uncanny anticipation of the future, Maurizio Ferraris was heavily involved in Derrida's work, thought, and writing. The following section outlines some of Derrida's key reflections on digital technology and thereafter moves to elucidate Ferraris' own work on the mobile phone.
The mid-1990s: deconstruction and digital technology
Turning to Derrida's deconstructive engagement with 'digital writing' technologies, the following section explains what it means to 'write' in a digital world and how this causes legal difficulties surrounding sexting. This section briefly covers four points of engagement from Derrida's work: content creation ('Web 2.0'), email, digital as compared to analogue writing, and the law's engagement with technology.
Web 2.0 and content creation
In 1993 Derrida's thoughts on the philosophy of writing led him to posit that developing digital mediums, such as multimedia devices and the internet, would soon allow the 'electronic larger public' to write digital content for themselves: 78
The technical development to which you allude confirms it … You will be less and less able to convince citizens that they should be content with national production once they have access to a global production from the outset by themselves. 79 Derrida's claim was significant for two reasons. Firstly because he foresaw, six years ahead of its mainstream realisation, what Darcy DiNucci would (in 1999) call 'Web 2.0'. 80 This term refers to the development of the internet from a platform of 'typical brochure-like displays of Times or Arial text' 81 to a platform akin to a 'transport mechanism, the ether through which interactivity happens'. 82 This version of the internet would host and connect multimedia to a multitude of devices, from 'TV sets' to 'car dashboard [s]', and from 'hand-held game machines' to 'cell phone[s]', 83 and perhaps most crucially it would 'also open the market to third-party publishersleading to a profusion of content that would in turn sell more [mobile] phones'. 84 This leads to the second significance of The first glimmerings of Web 2.0 are beginning to appear, and we are just starting to see how that embryo might develop. … The Web will be understood not as screenfuls of text and graphics but as a transport mechanism, the ether through which interactivity happens. It will still appear on your computer screen, transformed by video and other dynamic media made possible by the speedy connection technologies now coming down the pike. The Web will also appear, in different guises, on your TV set (interactive content woven seamlessly into programming and commercials), your car dashboard (maps, Yellow Pages, and other traveller info), your cell phone (news, stock quotes, flight updates), hand-held game machines (linking players with competitors over the Net), and maybe even your microwave (automatically finding cooking times for products). 81 Ibid. 82 Ibid. 83 Ibid. 84 Ibid 222.
Derrida's claim because he noted that this transformation would radically affect what was recognised as 'the market', and the 'consumers' and 'addressees' in it. 85 The public's ability to produce their own content, as third-party publishers, would transform the idea of a 'consumer' in the market because everyone would be able to produce their own content: '[i]t is precisely the concept of the addressee that would have to be transformed'. 86 Said differently, Derrida commented that 'those who were previously in the position of consumer-spectators can intervene in the market'. 87 And now, with 25 years' worth of hindsight, Derrida's prediction has been proved correct as the ubiquitous ability to instantly create, disseminate, and consume digital media has revolutionised the world. It was this liminal moment in the development of the internet and multimedia devices, most of all the mobile phone, which provided the bedrock for the sexting epidemic. 88 Lastly, Philip Armstrong has commented that Derrida's work also enabled conceptualisations of digital subjectivity, such as 'netizens, cybercitizens, or virtual communities', as well as 'cyberculture and cyberpolitics'. 89 And sexting now finds itself embroiled in questions of both digital subjectivity and cyberpolitics because if this act isas has been argued -'merely an expression of teen sexuality in a digital age', 90 then the abilities afforded by content creation, mass instant communications, and the privacy of mobile phones, have irreparably transformed adolescent sexuality into a 'digital sexuality' of the third millennium which needs to be accounted for in law. 91 3.2.2. Email: 'dromology' By 1996, Derrida was prioritising email over all other technological developments because its communication of digital written text was nearly instantaneous. He opined that 'even more than the fax, [email] is on the way to transforming the entire public and private space of humanity'. 92 Email's importance lay in its 'unprecedented rhythm' and 'quasiinstantaneous' delivery of information, 93 which we now see as the lynch-pin of sexting. 85 Derrida and Stiegler (n 78) 53-55. 86 Ibid 55. 87 Ibid 54. 88 Frances Perraudin, 'Boy of Five Among Nearly 400 Sexting Cases Dealt with by Police' The Guardian (12 July 2017) <https://www.theguardian.com/society/2017/jul/12/sexting-boy-five-400-police-children-explicit-pictures> accessed 30 August 2017. This article reports that a 10-year-old boy used an application (an 'app') called 'Oovoo' to send an explicit image. 'Oovoo' describes itself as follows: 'We're a global social media platform for connecting with friends and family via high quality video chat, video messaging and rich, collaborative video stories.' See <https://www.oovoo.com/about. html> accessed 30 August 2017. 89 Philip Armstrong, Reticulations: Jean-Luc Nancy and the Networks of the Political (University of Minnesota Press, 2009) 76. 90 Eraker (n 1) 563. 91 Armstrong (n 89) 78:
When and wherever a television is switched on, when and wherever a phone call is made, when and wherever an Internet connection is established, the question of "critical culture, of democracy, of the political, of deterritorialization erupts", whether this situation also implies the relatively simple procedures of using a mobile phone, going online, or analyzing how the techno-artistic production of film and television now possesses the ability, unprecedented in the history of humanity, to find itself almost immediately plugged into a global market.
The quote in Armstrong's passage is taken from Derrida and Stiegler (n 78) 65. 92 Jacques Derrida, Archive Fever: A Freudian Impression (Eric Prenowitz tr, The University of Chicago Press, 1996) 17. 93 Ibid. See also Carsten Strathausen, 'The Philosopher's Body: Derrida and Teletechnology' (2009) 9 CR: The New Centennial Rev 139, at 145: 'In other words, what separates writing from teletechnologies is the latter's unprecedented speed of recording, distributing, and reconstituting images and other information. It is a quantitative difference: electronic media move too fast.'
Whereas the prior generations of adolescents 'who took provocative self-portraits faced the hurdle of developing the film at a photo lab, and distribution was limited by the numbers of copies purchased', 94 in today's digital world 'camera phones and broadband connections enable instantaneous production and distribution' of the very same provocative self-portraits. 95 The study of speed, 'dromology', had been at the core of French theorist Paul Virilio's work since the late 1970s. 96 In 1977, Virilio stated: 'Western man has appeared superior and dominant, despite inferior demographics, because he appeared more rapid.' 97 And in 1998, 98 four years after Derrida's comments on email, Virilio commented that email represented the development of a 'cyber-acceleration' 99 leading to 'the instantaneity of the real-time image'. 100 In Derrida's work on the revolutionary capabilities of email, he sought to convey the 'geo-techno-logical shocks' which would have been felt by previous generations if they 'had had access to … computers, printers, faxes, televisions, teleconferences, and above all E-mail'. 101 Such 'geo-techno-logical-shock[s]' relating to the speed and instantaneity of sexting are partly responsible for the contemporary problems in legislating for this act but such difficulties caused by the instant communications of mobile phones need to be recognised and accounted for, not ignored, as Derrida illustrated.
Digital and analogue writing
Derrida's engagement with digital writing also focused on some of the technologies shaping writing's future, including home computers and the writing programmes featured on them. 102 Derrida engaged with the thought of the German philosopher Martin Heidegger regarding the 'authenticity' of writing produced by methods beyond the hand and the pen. Heidegger's renowned pessimism for technology was not shared by Derrida 103 but Heidegger's work offers an interesting point of note regarding sexting. Heidegger argued that a type of pragmatism associated with the handfrom the Greek word πράγμα 104would be lost due to technological advances. Significantly, his famous 94 Eraker (n 1) 563. 95 The instrument that has made most of an impact on the world of today, the computer, was first thought of as a calculating apparatus and then used for registering writing; only later did it evolve, just as happened to the ancient scripts, into a means of communications. case-study for this point focused on the difference between writing by hand and writing via a typewriter:
Ibid
The typewriter veils the essence of writing and of the script. It withdraws from man the essential rank of the hand, without man's experiencing this withdrawal appropriately and recognizing that is has transformed the relation of his Being to his essence. 105 Heidegger argued that 'inauthentic' technology wrought the decline of pragmatism, or Handlung in German, in which 'thing and activity are thought in the unity of a Handeln governed by the essence of the hand'. 106 He commented: 'The essence of modern technology lies in enframing. Enframing belongs within the destining of revealing … The destining of revealing is in itself not just any danger, but the danger.' 107 The dangerous technology of the typewriter would no doubt extend to the computer, the laptop, and certainly to the mobile phone. Timothy Campbell comments that Heidegger's work on technology is 'thanatopolitical', meaning that technology is presented as a phenomenon inextricably linked with controlling and driving life towards death. 108 Heidegger's work presents a 'deep association of improper writing' with 'a technologically rendered revelation that places mankind at risk', 109 and further his work also operates 'in the knowledge that where technology is augmented, (human) beings can be dominated'. 110 One wagers that Heidegger would view that the aforementioned sexting 'timebomb' is due the damaging prevalence of the mobile phone in today's world. 111 And perhaps Heidegger's most relevant account of the damage being done comes from his warning of technology's ability to 'captivate', 'bewitch', and 'dazzle' to the point where it 'come[s] to be accepted and practiced as the only way of thinking'. 112 In our contemporary world there seems to be little beyond, or little which surpasses, the ubiquity, power, borderless-reach, and instantaneity of the mobile phone.
Law in the digital age
The final point to take from Derrida's work on digital technologies concerns his thought on how law would inevitably have to adapt to such technologies. Beginning with a reflection on the 1991 Rodney King police-brutality case in Los Angeles, 113 Derrida remarked that as a consequence of a world in which consumer electronics, email, and the internet would soon become prevalent, legal systems would have to evolve: 'the entire axiomatic of law or, in any case, of the Western law we're talking about, clearly has to be and will have to be transformed and reelaborated in view of the technological mutations we're talking about'. 114 Although blunt, Derrida's thesis was nevertheless correct: juridical systems did have to accommodate the technological revolutions of the digital age and the abilities they provided for legal testimony, evidence, and the more general practice of law. 115 Following this remark, Derrida then made a nuanced observation which we can transpose onto the twenty-first-century problematic of sexting.
Derrida's observation referred to the capabilities afforded by 'Web 2.0'. He stated: [N]ot only is all regulation in the form of state law, all cultural protection decided by a nationstate dangerous in itself, but it is outdated from a technical standpoint. 116 Referring to the imminent explosion of content creation, Derrida made it clear that law was already out of date 'from a technical standpoint' because it could not accommodate a future in which individuals created content. Instead, law was premised upon state-created content which was already outdated due to developments where, for example, 'rock bands have appropriated what are called "samplers" for treating the sound archive, and a new music has appeared, produced primarily through archive manipulation'. 117 With hindsight, this observation speaks volumes regarding the contemporary world in the third millennium in which taking a photo on a mobile phone, or posting to social media, is a banal and everyday common occurrence. And in the case of sexting, this development has not been accounted for in law and consequently, just as Derrida warned, the law is ludicrously outdated from a technical standpoint.
Derrida, technology, deconstruction
In summarising Derrida's thoughts on digital technology, a few key points can be made: he envisioned an age in which digital writing would allow the global public, through new software and devices, to write and instantaneously distribute their own digital content over numerous social planes as 'addressors' instead of 'addressees'. 118 With hindsight, we can note the blistering speed with which Derrida's vision of writing was achieved: Today, as a result of the exponential growth of Web 2.0, content creation and distribution via the mobile phone is the writing device for a growing percentage of the global population. As Ferraris commented in 2005, it is plain to see 'the huge change of 114 the last thirty years, in which have witnessed an explosion in the systems of registration and of writing, from computers to mobile phones and the Web'. 120 And as if by way of evidencing this, during the time of writing Facebook announced that it now hosts 2 billion monthly users across the globe. 121 This leads to Derrida's final comment, made in 1996, on how everyday life of the future would be affected by 'the Web': Think about the 'addiction' of those who travel day and night in this WWW. They can no longer do without these world crossings, these voyages by sail, or veil, crossing or cutting through them in its turn. 122 In describing the 'addiction' felt amongst early internet users, Derrida was prophetically commenting on a symptom of internet usage which, in the 2010s, has become a well-known issue. 123 A Nielsen study in 2017 found that adults in the US, aged 18-34 years old, spend nearly 27 hours a week connected to some form of audio-visual media: a quarter of that media, over 6 hours' worth, is internet-connected social media and 78% of that social media is accessed via a smartphone. 124 Even J.G. Ballard, when questioned about this issue in 2003, answered that his girlfriend 'lives on the internet' 125 and that 'I observe the Internet over [her] shoulder; I don't want to get too close because it might suck me in.' 126 The importance of describing this scale of internet usage, as well as the tremendous amount of content which is written into it, must be recognised when it is recalled, once again, that the current law on sexting does not have any comprehension of this medium and its significance in the twenty-first century.
In now moving to the work of Ferraris, it is important to contextualise this move. During the period of his engagement with digital technology, 1993-1996, Derrida was a friend of, interlocutor to, and writing partner with Maurizio Ferraris. This relationship culminated in a co-written book between the two philosophers published in Italian in 1997 and translated into English in 2001 as A Taste for the Secret. 127 The book serves as a marker of not only Ferraris' 'Derridean education', 128 but also the subject matter via which Ferraris became acquainted with deconstruction, because during the writing of the book Derrida was analysing the technologies of home computers, email, and the internet. It was no doubt this just like credit cards and documents'. 136 It is the combination of a wireless telephone, the utilities found in 'agendas and address books, watches and alarm clocks, cameras and recorders', 137 and an entertainment device for 'images, videos, films, [and] music'. 138 And all these features, as well as the ability to instantaneously share user-generated content across borders, are housed in a small wireless device which concentrates its operation to our hand, as Heidegger noted was so important for an authentic human experience: 'The kind of Being which equipment possessesin which it manifests itself in its own rightwe call "readiness-to-hand" (Zuhandenheit).' 139 Ferraris argues that because the mobile phone is a 'handy and hand-sized', 140 'handy and palm-sized', 141 'a hand-sized object', 142 it replaces the computer at 'the center of everything: intentions and intuitions, writing and images, affects, [and] instrumental communication'. 143 The mobile phone is the quintessential object of the twenty-first century and is the 'writing machine' of our age, as the culmination of Derrida's deconstructive analysis of digital technology. 144 And, more pertinently concerning sexting, it is 'the specific features or affordances of mobile phones, social networking sites and other communication technologies' which allow for the 'creation, exchange, collection, ranking and display of images'. 145 In context, this quintessential device is used by adolescents 'every second of the day': 'If I am not using it I feel a bit weird.' 146 And their use 'from waking up in the morning to going to sleep at night' 147 is partly encouraged by the privacy the device affords, which in turn allows adolescents to experiment with sexualised content, such as sexting, away from prying eyes:
With your Blackberry like with my phone, my parents don't really check my phone yeah. That is why most people hide their stuff in their Blackberry. But on Facebook yeah like it is normal for your parents or you family to have Facebook, and they will check it. 148 The personal nature of the mobile phone has led to an unprecedented connection between the sexual lives of adolescents and the digital world: '[k]ids can access the technologies anywhere and there are so many of them'. 149 And such privacy to conduct digital 136 Ferraris (n 7) 29. 137 Ibid 10. 138 140 Ferraris (n 7) 64. 141 Ibid 62. 142 Ibid 65. Of note here is that the relationship between the size of the mobile phone's screen and the hand's reach, flexibility, and dexterity, is already a major concern to manufacturers. See Yu-Cheng Lin, 'The Relationship between Touchscreen Sizes of Smartphones and Hand Dimensions' in Constantine Stephanidis and Margherita Antona (eds), Universal Access in Human-Computer Interaction: Applications and Services for Quality of Life (Springer, 2013) 643. 143 Ferraris (n 7) 64. 144 Ibid 44. See also 59:
[the mobile phone] unifies in a limited space all of the functions listed so far [telephone, email, internet], thus constituting the absolute device, and because it is mobile, it also presents itself as the effect of writing and teleportation. It is a gigantic and yet pocket-size archive that one day will incorporate all kinds of the data about us. 145 Ringrose, Gill, Livingstone, and Harvey (n 25) 8. 146 Ibid 26. This is the transcript of a school girl 13-14 years old taken from the interview contained in the report. 147 Ibid. 148 Ibid. 27. This is part of the same transcript referred to in (n 146). 149 Shariff (n 35) 97.
sexual relationships is shaping their lives at a rapid pace: 'The prevalence of mobile internet technologies in young people's lives was dramatically reshaping modes of communication, peer intimacy, and even romantic relationships.' 150 But as Ferraris' work illustrates the significance of the mobile phone does not end with its status as the ultimate writing machine and the bridge for digital-sexuality, because it also has ontological ramifications regarding the social world and 'weak textualism'. These ramifications lead to another crucial insight into why neglecting the mobile phone in legislating against sexting is a catastrophic error because the mobile phone writes real, significant, and powerful social objects into our world which must be accounted for.
'Weak textualism': the ontology of the mobile phone
Following the account of the mobile phone as the ultimate device, Ferraris then moves to illustrate its ontological significance through his own philosophy -'I propose a theory of writing' 151which is influenced by, and yet critical of, Derrida's thought. Ferraris' ontology is critical of Derrida's famous maxim '[t]here is nothing outside of the text', 152 which declared 'the nonexistence of a reality independent from our interpretations, the language we use, and the theories through which we refer to it'. 153 Derrida's declaration comes from his lack of belief in a 'transcendental signifier'. 154 Yet Ferraris argues this is a 'transcendental fallacy' 155 on Derrida's behalf because it is not the case 'that reality, including physical objects, depend[s] on our conceptual schemes'. 156 As Ferraris puts it, 'mountains and rivers are what they are all on their own', and thus exist independently of what Derrida would call 'texts'. 157 Given this, Ferraris argued only certain types of objects in the world which are dependent on 'texts', things he refers to as 'social objects': My claim, then, is that 'there is nothing social outside the text' and not 'there is nothing outside the text', since the constitutive role of social objects is Object = Inscribed Act. 158 The claim that 'there is nothing outside the text' only applies, for Ferraris, when referring to 'social objects'. These are but one kind of object within a range of three classifiable kinds. 159 First there are 'physical objects' such as 'mountains, chairs, tabernacles', 'Mont Blanc', or any other 'objects [which] do not depend on subjects'. 160 These objects 'exist in space and time, and are independent from subjects knowing them'. 161 Secondly there are 'ideal objects', like 'the properties of a triangle', 'an arithmetic operation', or 'the principle of noncontradiction', which 'are discovered and not invented'. 162 These differ from 'physical objects' because an 'ideal object' does not exist in space and time yet it does require the interaction of a subject 'in the phase of their socialization: I discover a theorem and publish the outcome'. 163 Thirdly and most importantly for Ferraris, are 'social objects' such as 'a promise, a bet, a federal state, a football team, or an epic poem'. 164 These objects 'do not exist as such in space, since their physical presence is limited to [an] inscription', 165 thus they only exist when 'they exit from the mind of one person, are made manifest, and are then inscribed in the external world', in what Derrida would call a 'text'. 166 These 'texts' can consist of 'an inscription on paper, magnetic memory, or a person's mind'. 167 And social objects, such as 'legal writings', 'ID cards', and 'credit cards', are now becoming inscribed due to 'simply blips in the computer'. 168 Here it becomes clear why Ferraris' ontology is so pertinent for sexting: the 'sext' is a social object: Social objects follow from the registration of acts that involve at least two persons and that are inscribed on any kind of physical medium, from marble to neurons, by way of paper and the world of the web. 169 Consequently, as a social object the sext is the only type of object for which Ferraris would agree with Derrida that there is nothing outside of the text. 170 This means that even though Ferraris' 'viewpoint derives directly from Derrida's philosophy', which itself 'offers the basis for a very powerful social otology', 171 there are nevertheless key 'corrections' which Ferraris makes to Derrida's work. For example: 'In short, triangles exist even without an inscription, but contracts do not, and Derrida confused triangles with contracts.' 172 Ferraris' theory is named 'weak textualism': it accounts for the process through which 'social objects are constructed by idiomatic inscriptions' and then exist thereafter within 'texts'. 173 This theory is a 'weakening of Derrida's thesis' because it reduces [t]here is nothing outside of the text into 'there is nothing social outside the text'. 174 Weak textualism provides the social ontology in Ferraris' work, 'allow[ing] him to understand, and make us understand, mobile phones', 175 because it explains that through the writing which they enable, there is a 'world in which the mobile phone exists but which, rather paradoxically, seems also to exist in the mobile phone'. 176 As Harcourt comments: For many of us, our digital existence has become our lifethe pulse, the bloodstream, the current of our daily routines. For adolescents and young adults especially, it is practically impossible to have a social life, to have friends, to meet up, to go on dates, unless we are negotiating the various forms of social media and mobile technology. 177 Here it becomes even clearer how and why Ferraris' work vividly resonates with act of sexting. The mobile phone dominates in creating a very particular type of philosophical object and a world thereafter, in which sexting resides. Said differently, if the mobile phone is 'an absolute object precisely in that it is, so to speak, a mouse that needs no computer', 178 then it is the culmination of all digital writing technology and is at the forefront of writing our social ontology: this is what we learn initially from Derrida's, and then Ferraris', philosophy of writing. Weak textualism is shown to be at its most pertinent when one asks the question 'what is there inside the computer?': 'An enormous mass of registration and inscription, just as there is in your mobile phone and in so many other gadgets. I think it would be harder to find a stronger proof of weak textualism.' 179 Thus, Ferraris' work on both the mobile phone as a device, and weak textualism as an ontological theory, explains the social and ontological grounding for sexting.
Turning to sexting, given that adolescents' 'habitual use of and reliance of digital technology as an essential means of peer networking' is at an all-time high, 180 the mobile phone reigns in creating social objects. These include SMS, MMS, and platform hosted messages ('WhatsApp', 'Snapchat', etc.), as well as emails, and what have been defined as 'web 2.0 activities' 181 which include social media posts. 182 Ferraris noted this in 2009 whilst writing a book which would be translated into English in 2013 as Documentality: Why It Is Necessary to Leave Traces. 183 Because in 2009 all his projections from 2005 had been proved correct, by the release and exponential success of the Apple iPhone in 2007: ' … the iPhone. What is futuristic about this? … the only speed that is used to measure its efficiency is that of its connection … it is more convenient for writing and registering'. 184 Indeed, as per Professor John Naughton in 2016:
The iPhone was the first real smartphone and it changed the world because it changed the way people connected to the net. It began the inexorable drift away from desktop and laptop computers as our gateways to the internet. In the next 10 years or so, another 5 billion of our fellow citizens will get internet connectivity, and almost all of them will acquire it via a smartphone. Which means thatas network infrastructure improvespeople will be online for most of their waking lives. 185 This revolutionary moment attached to the most successful smartphone model signals the fruition of Ferraris' theory on mobile phones and his ontology of weak textualism. It also serves to highlight what is at stake in understanding and then successfully legislating the behaviour associated with these devices, a task which the article now revisits. 178 Ferraris (n 7) 38. 179 Ferraris (n 17) 159. 180 Stone (n 10) 267. 181 Ringrose, Gill, Livingstone, and Harvey (n 25) 9. 182 Recall the Nielsen study (n 124) referred to above, in which it was found (at 6) that of the 27 hours a week that adults in the US aged 18-34 years old spend connected to audio-visual media, 78% spent of the time on social media is via a mobile phone. 183 
Sexting re-examined: social ontology and law
This section uses Derrida's and Ferraris' works on digital technology and mobile phones to provide a nuanced assessment of sexting. Their works will be used to illustrate the technological developments, philosophical implications, and cultural resonances behind sexting, in order for the law surrounding this act to be made more representative of the world it aims to govern. This is an alternative methodology to the current positivist frameworks applied to this issue which, as aforementioned, tend to only focus on the, nevertheless significant, difficulties regarding whether the acts in question should be prosecuted or not. 186 However, as noted by Nicola Henry and Anastasia Powell, attention needs to move beyond positivist accounts to investigate wider issues such as 'service providers of online communities and social media networks' 187 because these technological pathways and means allow for sexting to occur.
Writing social objects
The lunacy, if the law wishes to be adequately representative of the society it is supposed to govern, as is shown with the CJCA 2015s prohibition of revenge pornography.
An understanding of contemporary digital culture illustrates that the third millennium is responsible for the creation of an entirely new world, in which the digital self is gathering prominence over the limited analogue self:
… our lived experience is gravitating dramatically from the analog to the digital. The digital self, the second body of today's liberal democratic citizen, is overtaking his analog physical existence and becoming far more permanent, durable, tangible, and demonstrable. 195 This new digital world, which Ferraris shows is as a real world as one occupied by rivers and mountains, has now drastically 'outpaced both the law and technological limitations of prior generations'. 196 And in a time where 'the societal veil cloaking teenage sexuality has been lifted entirely and budding libidos have escaped from dim basements into cyber space', 197 the SOA 2003 produces three consequent failures by ignoring this. 198 They relate to those 'born digital', the legal boundaries attached to sexual behaviour, and the significance of age.
Three flaws of the current law
Those 'born digital'
The first failure relates to the adolescents who were 'born digital'. 199 These adolescents do not know a world without the internet and consequently their interactions with this omnipresent network are starkly different to those from previous generations. For example, 'most major aspects of their lives are mediated by digital technologies, from social interactions to academics to hobbies and entertainment'. 200 Moreover, the 'born digital' generation experience life in which 'digital technology is breaking down whatever semblance of boundaries existed … between the state, the economy, and private existence, between what could be called governing, exchanging, and living'. 201 In this new epoch in which there is an increasing blur between work and play, public and private, exposition and intimacy, it is nonsensical to demarcate the internet as something 'other' than a real and tangible aspect of an individual's personal life. Rather, '[t]hese technologies are loved and felt to be central to life, and to young people's sense of self. Indeed, life could be unthinkable without them'. 202 This is Ferraris' point when he states that the 'social objects' which inhabit these digital technologies, such as the sexual image sent in a sext, 'possess an autonomy and a hard, obtrusive, cutting and sometimes even dramatic consistency, which makes them very different from shadows or dreams': 203 in short, social objects are real and have profound impacts upon people's lives. As has been documented with adolescent school girls in Britain:
Mobile technologies, and in particular smart phones, suffuse the everyday lives of young people, structuring and shaping their experiences. As this group of 14-15 year old girls told us, their mobiles are a constant from waking up in the morning to going to sleep at night. 204 Thus, whereas older generations may see socialising through the internet as some sort of supplement to 'real life', for the 'born digital' generation socialisation via the internet and social objects is real life:
Mobile digital technologies are coming to permeate more and more aspects of young people's lives, with young people suggesting they would 'die' without their phones, that phones and social networks play a 'massive part' in their relationships, and are shaping most aspects of everyday lives. 205 Thus the weaving of social objects into the 'text' of the internet is not merely a banal activity for 'born digital' adolescents, it is their lifeblood. Consequently, the internet then becomes a natural medium through which to express sexuality and sexual identity, as noted by Joshua Garrison who comments that 'Web 2.0' and 'other interactive technologies, including the proliferation of inexpensive and embedded photographic and videographic equipment', have 'democratized' pornography so that now 'production itself has been decentered, and the boundaries between the pornographic consumer and producer have become blurred'. 206 Garrison's sentiment affirms and evolves Derrida's hypothesis from 1993, 207 whilst accurately accounting for how content creation has now, naturally, paved the way for sexting: '[s]exting could be viewed as merely an expression of teen sexuality in a digital age, reflecting a long-documented trend of teens "using whatever technology is at hand to express themselves and share their behaviour with the world"'. 208 As explained by Shaheen Shariff, apps such as Snapchat 'are attractive to a captive generation of youth who test social boundaries online as their hormones rage'. 209 She then makes the nuanced point that this is really 'no different from when social relationships were developed in the back seat of a car at a drive-in' in the 1950s. 210 Given this, there is great harm done to the lives of those who now find themselves dictated to by a law which has absolutely no understanding of what it means to engage in the creation of social objects as a natural action in the twenty-first century. Returning to Shariff's insightful work, this is the huge problem with a legal system which 'focus[es] on the kids' behaviour as though they were living in a society without influences'. 211 And from this then emerges the second point of failure: outdated legal boundaries given to sexual behaviour.
The legal boundaries of sexual activity
It is perhaps at least some consolation that noted authorities and legal scholars have realised the violent irony in deeming those who are below the age of majority to be 'child pornographers'. 212 A law which indiscriminately labels and sanctions all adolescents for their actions regarding sexting is simply not fit for purpose. In fact, it is pertinent to note that in England and Wales, at the time of writing, there has not yet been a single prosecution for sexting, despite the fact that the data points to tens of thousands of instances taking place. 213 This is no doubt due, in part, to the CPS' strong line of resistance against prosecution. 214 As well as this, official guidance from the ground-breaking NSPCC study into sexting from 2012 advises that: Importantly, unlike bullying, it cannot simply be generalised that all sexting is a problem. Thus any teacher must encompass within the discussion the recognition that young people are legitimately interested in their developing sexuality; thus exploring or playing with sexual ideas or relationships should not be ignored or rejected but issues of respect, consent and reciprocity in sexual relationships, including digital sexual communications should be discussed. 215 These evidential points signal towards a growing concern with the inaccurate, indiscriminate, and ill-thought legislation governing the sexual lives of adolescents with regards to sexting. The law which is in place requires amendment so that the consensual distribution of sexually explicit images is legal when done by those who are legally able to participate in the very activity which is the subject of such imagery. As has been argued by the North American legal scholar Julia Halloran McLaughlin regarding the same difficulty faced in her own jurisdiction:
Given the existing inconsistent treatment of the evolving rights of teens as they mature and the poor fit between child pornography law and teen sexting conduct, a law directed specifically at teen sexting is required to distinguish this conduct from that of pedophiles [sic.] and the purveyors of child pornography. 216 The implementation of a specific law regarding sexting, as opposed to mere reliance on a law which does not reflect the use of mobile phones, would be a sensible step for the law of England and Wales to take, given that the law is currently not being enforced due to its inadequacy. As the current law surrounding sexting is blind to the world foreseen by Derrida in the mid-1990s, and then explicated by Ferraris over 10 years ago, it is clearly not fit for purpose. We are now living in an expository world in which the mobile phone, more than ever before, allows us as 'digital subjects'or Homo digitalisto 'give ourselves up in a mad frenzy of disclosure' where we 'exhibit our most intimate details in play, in love, in desire' 217 into a world of 'social objects' which is parallel to an analogue world of 'physical objects'. This then leads to the third failure of the SOA 2003, its illogical framing of the age of adolescents to which the law applies.
What is an age?
The SOA 2003 effectively altered the age of a legal 'child' and in doing so it created an illogical distinction between the consensual age for corporeal and digital sexual activities: the former is 16 years of age whereas the latter is 18 years of age. This ill-thought distinction causes the difficulties seen above, given that digital communication is second-nature to born digital adolescents: 'sexting simply is a way of representing or replicating one's sexual corporeality'. 218 Such a distinction has long been a target for Derrida's deconstructive critique, given that this critique shows that all phenomenasuch as a person's ageare inscribed within a limitless field of referentiality and thus do not exist without being constituted by relation to other external phenomena: 'The presence of an element is always a signifying and substitutive reference inscribed in a system of differences and the movement of a chain.' 219 This critique drove Derrida's scepticism of discrete ages being used to impose legal boundaries because any given discrete age is subject to slippage whereby it is constituted both by inscribed references to other ages and by the stipulated rights, obligations, or legal physiognomies of those other ages.
As an example, writing in 2000, Derrida was extremely critical of a 1989 death penalty case, Penry v. Lynaugh, in which the US state of Texas sought to execute a convicted criminal who was of a suitable legal age ('twenty-two years old at the time of the crime') but only the mental age of a child ('but, according to the experts, had the mental age of a sixand-a-half-year-old-boy'). 220 Here, deconstruction allowed Derrida to interrogate the concept of 'an age', and to ask '[w]hat is an age and at what age is a subject legally responsible?' 221 Derrida's questioning aimed to highlight that an age, whatever it may be, is composed of: the multiplicity of mental and social ages in each of us, but also by the more serious existence of the differences between the age of so-called mental, social consciousness, etc., and the age, if there is one, of the unconscious. 222 Because deconstruction reveals that a singular age is always multifaceted -'the multiplicity of ages, our ages, of the heterogenous ages that divide up our lives as 217 Harcourt (n 8) 18. 218 Garrison (n 206) 359. 219 Derrida (n 74) 369. 220 Jacques Derrida, The Death Penalty: Volume II (Elizabeth Rottenberg tr, Geoffrey Bennington and Marc Crépon eds, The University of Chicago Press, 2017) 10. The case in question here was Penry v. Lynaugh 492 U.S. 302 (1989) . However, the defendant was not executed due to the subsequent ruling in Atkins v. Virginia 536 U.S. 304. 221 Derrida (n 220) 11. 222 Ibid. mortals' 223 -Derrida's work has a criminological impact in critiquing the SOA 2003. His work deconstructs legal subjectivity on a metaphysical level and consequently enriches the positivist critique of legal subjectivity in the work of Fenhalls, 224 McLaughlin, 225 and Shariff. 226 By developing the critique of the different consensual ages for corporeal and digital sexual activities Derrida's work offers an important critique of the conceptual apparatus which drives legal reasoning: 'law has not reckoned with this other thinking of age even though, as you know, … penal discourse has been obsessed … with the question of legal age'. 227 Against the obsession whereby discrete ages purport to provide truths of the world on a metaphysical level, Derrida's work shows the illogical fallacy underpinning this legal reasoning; a discrete age which acts as a legal boundary is in fact already infused with elements outside itself.
The occurrence of these three flaws resulting from the nonsensical application of a technologically outdated law serve as evidence that the law requires change, whereby it can account for a world inclusive of prevalent, consensual, sexually explicit social objects. Having now assessed this landscape, made evident by Derrida's and Ferraris' work, the article now moves to examine developments in Australian law which may illustrate a remedy for the ill-fated implementation of the SOA 2003. The move to Australian case-study seeks to conclude this article by suggesting a suitable legal framework for the social ontology explicated throughout.
Conclusion: legislating sexting
In 1995, Virilio stated that digital technologies would find their niche in, amongst other situations, connecting lovers at a distance: 'distancing brings (interactive) lovers together'. 228 Virilio believed this connection, as Derrida had noted, 229 would occur at near-instantaneous speeds: 'everything is ruled by lightning, and the coup de foudre of disunited lovers suddenly becomes a coup de grâce.' 230 With the ubiquity of the mobile phone and prevalence of sexting it appears that Virilio's premonition, like Ballard's aforementioned vision, has rung true. And in Australia the country now faces the consequences of this new age in which legislation, just like in England and Wales, is drastically outdated. But there are legislative initiatives currently underway in Australia which could serve as blueprints for future amendments to the law of England and Wales, which urgently needs to reflect how adolescents use their 'absolute device'. This ideal for a 'range of options' adheres to the report's comment that it shares the 'concern that young people are criminalised for sexting', something which it adds 'has been raised in several jurisdictions'. 240 Again, this assessment coalesces with much of what has been made clear from the context of England and Wales. Building on this, the legislative proposals from the state of Victoria then provide suggestions for the next step in developing suitable law for sexting.
The state of Victoria
Like the state of Queensland, the state of Victoria has investigated, and is currently implementing, how to alter its law regarding child pornography, child exploitation material, and sexting, to produce legislation which is fitting for the twenty-first century. To that end, there is currently an amendment in the 'Sex Offenders Registration Amendment (Miscellaneous) Bill 2017' which would grant a right of appeal to those convicted of child sex offences for having received an indecent photo from an adolescent under the age of 18: 241 The Bill introduces a scheme enabling young adults who are found guilty of one or more specified sex offences to apply in limited circumstances for a court order exempting them from being 'automatically' registered upon being sentenced (a 'registration exemption order'). Persons who have already been 'automatically' registered as a result of being sentenced for a specified offence before the commencement of this Bill will also be able to apply for a registration exemption order removing them from the Register of Sex Offenders. 242 This necessity of the amendment results from the recent attention which has been given to sextingas illustrated via Queensland's reportsin which it has been discovered that this activity is not adequately accounted for in law. From the 'Explanatory Memorandum', just referred to, in an explanation of Clause 7 of the bill it notes that:
The purpose of these order is to give the courts greater discretion to prevent the 'automatic' registration of young adults sentenced for specified offences where they are not a risk, or are only a low risk, to the sexual safety of one or more persons or of the community. 243 Accordingly, at the court's discretion, an adolescent registered as a sex offender could have their record expunged should they meet certain criteria. Such criteria include that the applicant was either 18 or 19 years old at the time of the offence, that they pose no, or a low, risk to the sexual safety of the community, that they have not been found guilty of other related offences, and that the adolescent in question is, or was, over 14 years old. 244 So, for example, if an 18-year-old took pictures of their 17-year-old sexual partner with their personal mobile phone, with their consent and only for the partner's gratification, and these were the only instances which would make the 18-year-old liable for registration, then it may well be that their record could be expunged by the court. In summary, this practical amendment seeks to provide a way around the illogical and severe sanction which currently operates against consensual adolescent sexting and consequently should be considered as an option for England and Wales, short of full scale reform.
Concluding thoughts
The current landscape of digital technology is immense. The number of social objects which inhabit this landscape is gargantuan. As correctly hypothesised by Derrida in 1993, billions of people around the world now create and share their own digital content via the internet: 'those who were previously in the position of consumer-spectators can intervene in the market'. 245 At the heart of this still growing movement is the mobile phone, 'the absolute device', 246 which Ferraris, ten years ago, described as 'perfectly embody[ing]' the writing system for social ontology. 247 He has, arguably, been proved right, as this device now heralds a new dawn for 21st century living. And the complication which has arisen regarding sexting is but one of a myriad of complications which the law is currently dealing with and will no doubt have to deal with in the future. However the requirement of acknowledging the digital topology of today's world is paramount in providing a legal system which coalesces with contemporary life. This is evidently the case with regards to sexting within the res publica and once again recalls an insight gleaned from a deconstructive methodology:
What circulates on the internet, for instance, belongs to an automatic space of publication: the public/private distinction is already being wiped out there, with the lawsuits, the allegations of rights and legitimation that proliferate from that, but also the movements toward the appropriation of the res publica. Today this is one of the big political issuesit is politics. 248
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